This paper investigates the political economy of FEMA after its post-9/11 merger with the Department of Homeland Security. Using panel data for the post-DHS merger but pre-Katrina period, we examine how FEMA's much-debated reorganization has impacted the strong political influences on disaster declaration and relief spending that existed before FEMA's reorganization. We find that although politically-important states for the president continue to have a higher rate of disaster declaration, disaster expenditures are no longer higher in states with congressional representation on FEMA oversight committees. These results suggest reorganization has reduced some of the political pressures within FEMA.
Introduction
In February 2003 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was placed under the authority of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under a federal government reorganization plan. The impetus behind the reorganization was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Following the attacks, several members of Congress, as well as the White House, called for a radical reorganization of the U.S. government's anti-terrorism and anti-disaster programs. The goal of the restructuring was to increase the efficiency and responsiveness of government agencies in preventing and responding to future terrorist attacks.
The potential impact of FEMA's merger with the DHS has been hotly debated. For instance, a report by the Brookings Institute that discussed the potential merger argued that "While a merged FEMA might become highly adept at preparing for and responding to terrorism, it would likely become less effective in performing its current mission in case of natural disasters as time, effort and attention are inevitably diverted to other tasks within the larger organization" (Daalder 2002: 24) . In contrast, former FEMA Director Michael Brown has argued that Americans would be better served under the new organizational structure because it would create a "FEMA on steroids" that was faster, more responsive and more efficient (quoted in Elliston 2004 ).
In addition to questions about the merger's potential impact on FEMA's effectiveness in delivering disaster relief, FEMA's reorganization under the DHS has raised another important question: How has the new organization impacted the political economy of FEMA disaster relief decisions? Given that the dynamics governing the political side of FEMA-related political economy have clearly changed rather dramatically since the merger, it is important to investigate how FEMA's post-9/11 reorganization has impacted the federal government's disaster relief decision making.
Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, a flurry of new research has begun to examine the reasons behind FEMA's mistakes and mishandling of disaster relief in the post-reorganization period (see Congleton 2005 , Shughart 2005 , Sobel and Leeson 2005 , Chappell et al. 2007 , Ewing and Sutter 2007 , Guion, Scammon and Borders 2007 , Leeson and Sobel 2007 . Prior to this work, earlier research by Garrett and Sobel (2003) examined the political economy of FEMA.
Using data for the period 1991 through 1999, prior to FEMA's reorganization, this research found that political pressures were strongly at work in both the disaster declaration process, due to the influence of the president, and in the allocation of FEMA spending across states, due to the influence of congressional oversight. Between 1991 and 1999, the president declared more disasters in states that were politically important to him and states with greater representation on FEMA's congressional oversight committees received more FEMA relief, controlling for other factors that might affect this, than states with less such representation.
Using panel data on presidential disaster declarations and FEMA disaster expenditures in the U.S. states for the post-DHS merger but pre- Katrina, 2003 Katrina, -2005 , this paper examines the political economy of the FEMA reorganization. We investigate two competing hypotheses regarding the impact of FEMA's reorganization under the DHS on the political allocation of FEMA resources. The first hypothesis suggests that FEMA's reorganization has been essentially unimportant for the allocation of FEMA relief. According to this view, congressional and presidential influences continue to strongly affect the rate of presidential disaster declaration and the disbursement of federal disaster relief payments. The second, and alternative, hypothesis suggests that FEMA's recent reorganization under the DHS has reduced the political manipulation of FEMA resources. According to this competing view, at least a part of the previous political influences and pressures that FEMA was subjected to before its reorganization under DHS have been severed or weakened. Because FEMA's reorganization has not affected the president's relationship to the FEMA disaster declaration process, the president should be expected to continue to exert political influence on disaster declaration. However, because of the different relationship between FEMA and its congressional oversight committees under the reorganization, the impact of congressional oversight may have diminished following FEMA's merger with the DHS. In short, according to this second hypothesis, the merger has increased the bureaucracy associated with congressional oversight, weakening the influence of any one committee over FEMA, and has placed its relatively small and inflexible budget within the much larger and more flexible DHS budget making it a less likely political target. This paper empirically investigates these competing hypotheses and finds results that are consistent with the second one. We find that states that are politically important to the president continue to have a higher rate of disaster declaration. However, we find that following the merger of FEMA with the DHS, disaster expenditures are no longer higher in states having congressional representation on the congressional oversight committees, implying the presence of less political pressures within FEMA than existed prior to DHS reorganization.
Our explanation for this result is that the merger of FEMA with the DHS introduced numerous new layers and unclear lines in the oversight process, and also created power struggles among the various oversight committees responsible for FEMA resource allocation. A new and interesting political dynamic is at work at FEMA-one in which congressional oversight committees have less direct influence in the post-merger period. The situation is best explained by exploiting insights from Tullock's (1965) economic analysis of bureaucracy.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. We begin by providing a brief history of the organizational structure of FEMA and how disaster relief policy has evolved. We then delve deeper into the political economy present at the main FEMA relief decision nodes when political pressures may enter into internal decision making. These two nodes are the decision to declare a disaster and then the subsequent disaster funding level. We then present our empirical results and a discussion of the current political economy of FEMA based on our findings. We conclude with the implications of our analysis. and is meant to provide guidelines for the U.S. government to deliver disaster relief to its citizens. The Act declares that the president has unilateral authority to declare an "emergency" which then triggers federal aid to supplement relief from state and local agencies. The reason behind the unilateral power granted to the president is to increase the response of the federal government to disasters. Aid for disasters is housed in the Disaster Relief Fund, which is controlled by the DHS. The funds allocated to the Disaster Relief Fund remain available until they are expended.
FEMA and Sources of Political Influence
Because FEMA is a federal agency, congress has a responsibility for the oversight of its operations. Prior to the merger with the DHS, FEMA was an independent entity with direct congressional oversight. Following the 2003 merger, congressional oversight of FEMA has now become indirect. Congressional oversight now takes place over the DHS of which FEMA is one part. FEMA's annual budget varies between $2 and $8 billion. While this is a substantial sum, it is only a minor part of the Department of Homeland Security's $40 billion-plus total annual budget. After the reorganization, FEMA moved down in the oversight process. The DHS is now subjected to direct congressional oversight and FEMA essentially became lost in the mix. As we will discuss in more detail, the size of the DHS, combined with a lack of clear oversight, has led to political infighting and turf battles over control of the larger DHS budget (see Foley and Rudman 2004) . In what follows, we consider the president and congressional oversight as two potential avenues of political influence on the operations of FEMA within DHS.
Presidential Influence on FEMA
The first avenue of influence over FEMA is the process of disaster declaration. Under the Stafford Act there is no clear guideline for when an event is 'severe' enough to be declared as an official disaster. Instead the president is given unilateral discretion over this process. When a disaster occurs, the governor of the affected state contacts the president requesting a disaster declaration and the president then makes a final decision as to whether or not to declare a disaster.
On average, the president generally grants slightly under three-fourths of such requests.
2 From 1981 to 2006 the average number of disasters declared per year was 40, and while a rare few of these were for weather events such as Hurricane Katrina, which were clearly major disasters, the vast majority were declared for 'severe' snowstorms, rainstorms, wind, and other smaller scale weather events.
The basic public choice model makes two specific predictions with respect to this process. First, presidents should be more likely to declare disasters during reelection years.
Second, presidents should be more likely to declare disasters in those states that are more politically important. Both of these hypotheses were confirmed for the 1991-1999 data (see Garrett and Sobel 2003) . Here we examine these hypotheses using data for every disaster that occurred from post-reorganization in 2003, up to but not including Hurricane Katrina in 2005. A description of our data and data sources is available in Appendix I. Our null hypothesis is that the reorganization has had little or no impact on this part of the political pressure on the disaster relief process since the reforms mainly impacted operational and budgetary oversight through congressional channels.
We begin by examining this hypothesis about reelection years the raw data, which presents a striking pattern. Figure In addition to these variables, we also include several other variables that proxy the political importance of states, such as an indicator of whether the state's governor is of the same political party as the president and the percent of the state's congressional delegation that is the same party as the president. Our controls include the insurance property claims in the state and year (to control for disaster severity), per capita income, and regional and year fixed effects. Table 1 presents the results of these regressions.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The results in Table 1 Presidents remain more likely to declare disasters in election years and in states that are potentially more politically important after the DHS merger.
The Influence of Congressional Oversight on FEMA
The second source of political influence in the disaster relief process is in the level of FEMA disaster relief spending given a disaster has been declared by the president. Garrett and Sobel (2003) found strong evidence that congressional oversight significantly influenced FEMA spending. In particular, states with representatives on House oversight committees for FEMA tended to get significantly more funding per disaster, ceteris paribus.
The theory behind this finding lies in the literature on the "congressional dominance model," which posits that bureaus will respond to the desires of Congress. Moe (1987 Moe ( , 1997 , Weingast and Moran (1983) and Weingast (1984) discuss how the model predicts that congressional committees that have both budgetary and oversight responsibilities will result in the tendency of bureaucrats to adopt and implement the policy preferences of the legislators.
The underlying logic is that bureaucrats want to maximize their budget in future periods and do so by satisfying the desires of legislatures in the present period.
4
A growing literature empirically tests the validity of the congressional dominance theory.
For instance, Wright (1974), Anderson and Tollison (1991) and Couch and Shughart (1997) analyze the connection between New Deal state spending and congressional power. These studies find a positive correlation between New Deal spending across states and congressional power. They also find a positive relationship between state spending and the importance of a state's electoral vote in the next presidential election. Faith et al. (1982) find that case rulings of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) tend to be more favorable for firms whose headquarters are located in a district having representation on the FTC congressional oversight committees.
Grier ( what committees have what oversight responsibilities meaning that DHS officials must allocate significant time and resources answering to numerous committee members without understanding their role or how they fit into the larger oversight process.
Tullock's (1965) economic analysis of bureaucratic organizations provides insight into
how the many bureaucratic layers of DHS oversight result in dysfunction. 5 Tullock (1965) emphasizes that bureaucracies suffer from the dual problems of information distortion and incentive compatibility. On the one hand, as the chain of command within a bureaucracy gets larger, it is more likely that information will be distorted. On the other hand, as bureaucracies become more decentralized -which lessens the problem of information distortion -it becomes increasingly difficult to ensure that the incentives of all the decentralized nodes are aligned in the pursuit of the broader overarching goal. When there are numerous and separate bureaucracies the result can be in-fighting and conflict, as each separate entity seeks to maintain and increase its position of power. While decentralizing bureaucracy reduces information distortions, it also requires that clearly-delineated rules are established to ensure that incentives are aligned across the decentralized nodes. Tullock concludes that the difficulty of finding a simultaneous solution to the information and incentives problems significantly constrains the effective reach of bureaucracies.
In The growth of bureaucracy associated with the increased oversight of the reorganized DHS has significant implications for congressional influence in the allocation of FEMA funds.
Prior to the reorganization, when FEMA was an independent agency, the allocation of disaster payments was relatively higher in states represented on oversight committees. However, with the introduction of numerous new levels of bureaucracy, there is general confusion over what oversight committees have control and power. In other words, because there are no clear lines of oversight, the officials of the DHS and the departments within the DHS must answer to "many masters" where no single master has strong influence or control. Moreover, the numerous layers of bureaucracy result in conflict between oversight committees that are supposed to be coordinated on the common goal of ensuring that the DHS delivers on its mission. This stands in stark contrast to the period when FEMA was an independent agency and had its own set of longstanding oversight committees. Before the merger with DHS, the oversight of FEMA was clear, as were the sources of congressional influence.
In addition, even if the new DHS oversight committees do receive favoritism in DHS spending, this could much more easily be accomplished through redirecting even bigger pots of money controlled under other DHS programs. FEMA represents only around 10 percent of the total DHS budget and virtually every other DHS program related to anti-terrorism has more expenditure flexibility and is easy to target geographically to a congressional district. This should make FEMA funds a less likely political target from congressional oversight than in the past.
Given the magnitude and confusion of congressional oversight in the post-DHS merger period, we attempt to test for whether congressional influence was still related to FEMA spending in the post-DHS but pre-Katrina era. In order to carry out our analysis we focus on the four main oversight committees identified by Foley and Rudman (2004 [Insert Table 2 The question we wish to answer is whether congressional oversight now plays a smaller role in FEMA spending patterns because of the unclear and unsettled oversight structure, and the relatively small share FEMA has become of the pool of DHS spending. Following Garrett and
Sobel (2003) we estimate Tobit models of FEMA spending using the updated data from [2003] [2004] [2005] . Appendix I contains a detailed a description of this data and its sources. A Tobit model is necessary here because the dependent variable-FEMA spending in state i in year t-is censored at zero, with some states having no disasters declared in a particular year and thus no funding, while others have disasters declared and then a positive value for the dependent variable. We follow the original specification used in Garrett and Sobel, simply redefining the committees used in the regressions. The regression is run in several ways. First, we use each state's total number of legislators on all oversight committees at that point in time as our key independent variable. Second, we split this variable into two variables for House and Senate. Finally, we use each state's total number of legislators on oversight committees, considering each individual oversight committee separately. Our control variables include insurance property claims, number of disasters declared, and regional and year dummies.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] Tables 3 and 4 present the results of these regressions. Table 3 shows the coefficient estimates, which measure the impact of each variable given a disaster has been declared. Table 4 shows the marginal effects, which also include any impact the underlying variable has on the zero/one nature of the problem-in other words, how it changes the unconditional expected value of disaster funding.
We find that all measures of congressional oversight are insignificant in all specifications. Thus, during the post-DHS merger (but pre-Katrina) period, there are no significant correlations between the levels of FEMA spending and membership on the major While the data on post-Katrina FEMA spending is still being generated, we did undertake a cursory analysis of evacuee funding across states and found no statistically significant results for congressional influence here either. Thus, our results seem to suggest that congressional politics likely played a minor to nonexistent role in FEMA spending decisions in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, and that this will likely continue to be unimportant into the future as long as the current organizational structure remains in place.
Concluding Remarks
Our analysis leads to several conclusions. First, the channel of political influence coming from the president, who is responsible for making decisions to actually declare a disaster, is as much at play today following the reorganization of FEMA under the DHS as it was before this merger.
This makes sense because, as we discuss above, the structure of this part of the disaster relief process was unaffected by the merger. When it comes to the chief executive's decision making about natural disasters, FEMA relief continues to be decided largely on political grounds. In presidential reelection years and in states more politically important to the president, the president declares more natural disasters, allowing the FEMA money to flow when and where it will help him most in the reelection. However, it is important to point out that to the extent that this in fact the case, the actual reason for such improvement is not among those suggested by proponents of the reorganization.
Ironically, by cutting clear and identifiable channels of political influence, the unwieldy and incoherent bureaucratic mess generated as a result of the FEMA/DHS merger may actually have unintentionally prevented politics from trumping need in making FEMA relief-related resource allocations.
Of course, this does not necessarily follow from our findings. It could be, for instance, that although congressional-based political influence has been removed through the merger, FEMA relief is getting tied up in the bureaucratic tangle or misdirected in alternative ways as a result of the reorganization. Further, other traditional problems of increased bureaucracy, which might be present as a result of FEMA's merger with the DHS, might also hamper the effectiveness of FEMA-provided disaster relief under the new organization. 6 Future work should explore these and related questions. -1923.45 -1922.68 -1922.34 Notes: Dependent variable is FEMA disaster expenditures. Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. Each marginal effect reflects the impact on the expected amount of disaster expenditures, as each variable impacts the probability of a disaster being declared and the level of expenditures. The sample period is 2003 to 2005. ***, **, * denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
